stead, the common concern underlying the states' rights and immigrants' rights opposition to the REAL ID Act is the elusiveness of political accountability. The REAL ID Act originated as a standalone bill to introduce changes that purport to disrupt terrorist travel and prevent another 9/11-type terrorist attack; the bill passed the House but failed to pass the Senate in 2004.2 Then, under a legislative compromise Congressional leaders imposed the Act upon the states with minimal debate in the Senate by guaranteeing its attachment to an unrelated, must-pass appropriations bill.' In 2005, the REAL ID Act was inserted into a bill funding the war in Iraq and aid for tsunami victims in Southeast Asia. 4 Immigration law has played the stepchild to foreign policy, labor policy, economic policy, and social services for more than century, generating federal policies (and politics) regarding noncitizens that are in continuous flux and typically fail to provide clear guidance to states.' The REAL ID Act and other post-9/11 policies signaled a critical shift in the post-1890s conception of immigration law and policy, traditionally seen as completely federal in jurisdiction and exclusive of state interference.' During the administration of President George W. Bush, the century-old presumption that immigration is essentially a federal foreign policy concern, and therefore outside the jurisdiction of states, has been undermined by recent efforts to bureaucratically restructure immigration within a new Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the agency responsible for recent state-by-state "federation" (or nationalization) of traditional state functions and personnel.' In the 2 Rep. James Sensenbrenner introduced the bill in an effort to implement more general recommendations from the 9/11 Commission for improving travel security and preventing ID fraud. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.; THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 383-90 (Norton 2004) . 6 See discussion infra Part I.
7 On March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security assumed operational control of a wide cross-section of functions, including intelligence operations and the Immigration and Naturalization Services (formerly housed within the Department of Justice). "The nature of American society and the structure of American governance make it impossible to achieve the goal of a secure homeland through federal Executive Branch action alone... . The goal of this Article is to discuss the justiciability of issues arising under immigration federalism by examining the constitutionality of the REAL ID Act. Part I discusses states' authority over non-citizens and the history of "immigration federalism" jurisprudence. Part II explores key provisions of the REAL ID Act, the WHTI, and similar attempts by the federal government to deputize states to engage in citizenship-policing and immigration enforcement. It describes the acute social and economic segregation that the denial of driver's licenses to non-citizens engenders, and examines a number of theories that attempt to capture the impact of the current immigration federalism framework or prescribe alternate approaches. Part III analyzes previous legal challenges under the Equal Protection Clause involving similar measures, and the viability of potential challenges under the Tenth Amendment and international human rights laws. The Tenth Amendment discussion in particular elaborates on the "dual sovereignty" framework for federalism in the immigration context that the Supreme Court articulated in Printz v. United States, 1 4 and questions the fate of future Congressional legislation that may be described as irrational, xenophobic, and untethered to political accountability.
I. STATE AUTHORITY OVER NON-CITIZEN "ALIENS": "IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM" JURISPRUDENCE
The passage of the REAL ID Act and the creation of a passport-like driver's license signals the federal government's recognition that its capacity and jurisdiction over the movement of non-12 According to then-Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, DHS would "develop a glide path to get this implemented in a way that gets it done in real time but doesn't jam it in a way that causes an enormous amount of disruption.... But we will need cooperation from others. Early planning on travel and early applications are going to make this process smoother. And of course working with states and getting alternatives in terms of drivers' licenses is going to make it less expensive and more convenient for travelers. In practice, federal authority over the day-to-day lives of noncitizens is "essentially interstitial," such that "the lives and affairs of foreign nationals and the transnational business of citizens remains largely subject to state laws and legal institutions."" States-and by extension, localities-are responsible for critical areas of daily public life, including schools, the workplace, public health, policing, and professional licensing. 17 The role of state laws in addressing immigration concerns has grown in recent years: in 2007, the number of enacted state laws addressing immigration was 240, approximately three times the number of such laws in 2006.18 The numbers are even more startling at earlier stages in the political process: 1,562 immigration-related state bills were introduced nationwide in 2007,9 an increase of 174% over 2006.20 In 2007, the three most commonly enacted immigration-related laws involved identification/licenses (40), employment (29), and public benefits (33) . 21 Although the reach of states' authority in this area has vacillated largely in response to national sovereignty concerns, the REAL ID Act represents a clear political shift within the Executive branch and factions within Congress to now expand it.
During the nation's infancy, immigration policies were handled by individual states, without major federal intervention until the 1798 Alien and Sedition Laws. 2 2 Since then, the Supreme Court has established and maintained a "federal exclusivity" principle asserting that immigration law is the sole province of the federal government. The notion that states may not regulate or interfere with federal immigration policy was illustrated early on in Chae Chan Ping v. United States ("The Chinese Exclusion Case"), where in 1889 the Court held that Congressional control over immigration-described as "the power of exclusion of foreigners"-was an essential component of national sovereignty. 23 Congress's plenary power over immigration has some textual support in the Constitution, to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization." 2 4 But one commentator has noted that the Court's sweeping claim of exclusive federal power in The Chinese Exclusion Case-reaching beyond issues of naturalization-could itself violate the Tenth Amendment's guarantee that "the powers not delegated to the United States are reserved to the states."
Federal exclusivity over immigration policies, laws, and the regulation of aliens within U.S. borders remained, conceptually, a foreign-relations concern ninety years after The Chinese Exclusion Case. In Narenji v. Civiletti, a D.C. Court of Appeals case, Iranian non-citizens challenged an alien registration regulation issued in response to the Iran-Contra Affair.
2 ' The U.S. Attorney General argued that it is "an element of the language of diplomacy by which international courtesies are granted or withdrawn in response to actions by foreign countries."" The intent or desire of the regulated individual to remain in the United States is immaterial by virtue of his or her non-citizen status.
Circuit Judge George MacKinnon, in his concurrence, wrote: 23 130 U.S. 581, 603-4, 609 (1889) ("Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power."). (a) (15) (Q) (2006) (specifying that an "immigrant" does not include a person "having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning" or a person "having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning.").
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Though the resident alien may be personally loyal to the United States, if his nation becomes our enemy his allegiance prevails over his personal preference and makes him also our enemy, liable to expulsion or internment. . .. That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in every sovereign state. 2 9 The U.S. registration requirement applied to several thousand Iranian students,so and the subsequent deportation of a significant number of these students was thus considered a wholly diplomatic move. 31 States are also generally prohibited from setting new immigration standards and policies. The Supreme Court, in Hines v. Davidowitz, held that federal preemption in immigration matters meant that states cannot impose additional restrictions on non-citizen residents unless they pertain to an area within states' constitutionally delegated powers.
3 2 Hines struck down a Pennsylvania law requiring aliens to register annually with the Department of Labor and show a specific card whenever demanded by a police officer or state labor official; failure to do so would result in a fine or imprisonment.
3 3 Underlying the Court's activism was its concern that the Pennsylvania statute directly conflicted with federal policies articulated during passage of Congress's Alien Registration Act, through which federal officials sought "to protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration system, and to leave them free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not only affect our international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty which the law has intended guarding against."
3
Unlike the Alien Registration Act, however, the REAL ID Act clearly evinces Congress' intent (albeit only through a maneuver that avoided a full floor vote on the bill as a stand-alone measure) that states play a If anything, the Supreme Court has cautioned the judicial branch to exercise judicial deference to the federal executive in matters of immigration law because of federalism concerns. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, Justice Jackson wrote:
Any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." 6 Federal exclusivity within the context of immigration power ends where the Court is dealing with "matters firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives."" Even then, the state need only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relationship between the state's goals and the classification."
Thus, for more than a century, U.S. immigration policy has been characterized by "immigration federalism," in which immigration decision-making and implementation rests solely at the federal level. "Immigration federalism" jurisprudence has only recently begun to respond to attempts by the Executive Branch to deputize states into regulating non-citizens and their movements.
II. THE REAL ID ACT AND THE RESURGENCE OF STATE IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY
Other provisions within the REAL ID Act sought to clamp down on immigration through other first-in-kind amendments. In addition to nationalizing standards for driver's licenses and other IDs issued by state departments of motor vehicles, the key provisions of the REAL ID Act also waived laws barring construction of 
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[Vol. 12:329 physical barriers at U.S. borders, modified asylum law to impose more rigorous standards for proving asylum claims, and defined issues related to terrorism." By imposing the driver's license requirements upon the states, the REAL ID Act purposefully sought to expand the role that states would play in assisting the federal government in disrupting and dislocating non-citizens without lawful presence in the United States.
A. Congress Demands Uniformity of State Licensing Standards
Under the Act, states must implement new eligibility criteria restricting the issuance of driver's licenses to U.S. citizens and certain categories of legally present non-citizens and temporary residents.
4 0 To be in compliance with the Act, states must verify the validity of each document proving an applicant's identity, including immigration documents, by consulting DHS databases and the Social Security Administration database.
4 1 The state would also have to issue different licenses for U.S. citizens and non-citizens, such that the non-citizens' licenses must indicate that they are temporary licenses valid only during the period of time the applicant is authorized to stay in the United States or, if there is no definite end to the period of authorized stay, a period of one year. 4 2 As a result, the expiration date of the license would, in the majority of cases, also indicate the date on which the holder's lawful presence in the United States is believed to end. The Act also requires the states to maintain and share their motorist databases with each other, 4 3 a measure that privacy advocates oppose on the grounds that it will lead to the creation of a national ID card system. However, a state's "compliance" with the REAL ID Act driver's license requirements is only optional on its face. If a state fails to or decides not to comply with the REAL ID Act minimum requirements before certain deadlines, its residents may not use their state DMV-issued cards for "any federal purpose," including boarding commercial airplanes, accessing federal courts, and using any other federal facilities. 4 4 DHS, the agency responsible for implementing REAL ID, issued final regulations in January 2009 that permit each state to apply for extensions if it can "demonstrat[e] material compliance with the core requirements of the Act and this rule" within three and one-half years; states must be in "material compliance" with REAL ID's requirements by January 1, 2010 to receive an additional extension until no later than May 10, 2011.45 By December 1, 2014, federal agencies will require all individuals under fifty years of age to present a "REAL ID" if that state-issued ID is being used for official purposes. 4 6 (However, individuals aged fifty or older would have a grace period of three years in which to apply for and receive a REAL ID from their state.) 4 7 Contrary to the government's claim that REAL ID's licensing requirements are voluntary and not coercive, the 2009 regulations clearly require that states that choose not to comply with the REAL ID Act must nevertheless "ensure that such license or identification card-(A) clearly states on its face that it may not be accepted by any Federal agency for identification or any other official purpose; and (B) uses a unique design or color indicator to alert Federal agency and other law enforcement personnel that it may not be accepted for any such purpose." 4 8 Essentially, states that choose to opt out of DHS's campaign to implement REAL ID are still told what their licenses must look like if they wish for their residents to enter any space maintained under federal jurisdiction.
Finally, if any states choose to resist complying with the REAL ID's putatively non-coercive licensing requirements-as several states have already declared they would do-it would reveal the REAL ID Act's fundamental design flaw and undercut the basic, rational basis of Congress' intent: to implement a "uniform" nationwide licensing system and a restrictive fifty-state database. Under the Department of Homeland Security, the REAL ID Act has also absorbed implementation of a related mandate, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative ("WHTI"), under which states are encouraged to adopt new quasi-federal roles. In 2004, Congress authorized the WHTI to goad border states into creating hybrid ID cards resembling both driver's licenses and passports known as "enhanced driver's licenses," while ending the practice of allowing U.S. and foreign travelers coming from Canada, the Caribbean, Bermuda, and Mexico to pass customs without showing proof of identity and nationality. 49 After January 2008, all such travelers must produce a passport or document or combination of documents deemed by DHS to "sufficiently denote both identity and citizenship."o DHS has warned border states that implementation of new rules under WHTI would create new burdens upon tourism and border-state trade unless those states collaborated with federal officials to develop and issue EDLs."
The statute that established the WHTI appears to provide series of safeguards passed to prevent terrorists from entering the United States. It called for an end to the practice of waiving the requirement to show documentation by tourists and travelers to the United States from North American and Caribbean destinations, and requires the implementation of a plan that nevertheless expedites the border-crossing of frequent travelers.
However, DHS has seized upon the law to leverage state buy-in and implementation of REAL ID standards by appealing to border states in their traditional de facto capacity of regulating national borders. As a result, two states that previously had publicly and vigorously opposed to complying with REAL ID-New York" and Washington"-have joined the ranks of border states Michigan, Vermont, and Arizona, in implementing an EDL pilot program for its residents. Coincidentally, EDL compliance requires state agencies to implement measures that exceed the already stringent requirements of the REAL ID Act in two aspects: 1) EDLs may only be issued to U.S. citizens; and 2) EDLs will implement radio-frequency identification technology, an even more developed technology than the two-dimensional bar code. Thus, compliance with WHTI will bring a state significantly closer to compliance with the REAL ID Act. 56 Immigration advocates have argued that EDL requirements, as in REAL ID, impose upon states an unnecessary "redundancy" and raise constitutional concerns regarding federal preemption because WHTI deals with the issue of documenting citizenship and applying federal immigration laws. 5 7
C. Federal "Deputization" of States: Driving Immigrants Underground
After a decade of false starts, the federal government has made a concerted effort after 9/11 to use its plenary power over immigration to expand the role that states may play in assisting with federal immigration enforcement. Initiatives such as the REAL ID Act and DHS's section 2 8 7 (g) program deputizing local police to enforce immigration laws have signaled a modern resurgence of states' and localities' involvement in directly restricting immigration, rather than indirectly through areas of traditional state authority such as punitive criminal, housing, and public benefits laws focused on immigrant residents.
The REAL ID Act arguably "deputizes" states to engage in the screening and classification of immigrants in three ways: (1) DHS's final regulations for REAL ID require states that refuse to comply with the REAL ID Act to nevertheless abide by federal requirements of a color or design that it is distinct from REAL IDcompliant licenses, thus raising suspicions against residents of such a state traveling interstate; (2) the final regulations require that all holders of REAL-ID-compliant temporary licenses (i.e., a substantial number of immigrant licensees) to renew in person at DMV offices, but waives this requirement for permanent U.S. residents; 5 8 (3) the final regulations vaguely require a state to "refer" non-citizen license applicants who may be out-of-status to a DHS agency: "In the event of a non-match in the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements ("SAVE") database, the DMV must not issue a REAL ID driver's license or identification card to an applicant, and must refer the individual to U.S. mented new exclusionary DMV policies-was pulled over for a minor traffic violation and thereafter deported. 6 2 In Queens, New York, an otherwise law-abiding Bangladeshi immigrant mother reported to a DMV office, in response to a letter suspending her license based on a Social Security number mismatch, was arrested and ultimately deported by ICE after what she believed was a tip from DMV employees.1 3
In 2007, NewJersey's Attorney General Anne Milgram issued a policy requiring local police to interrogate individuals arrested for certain crimes about their immigration status and to report out-ofstatus persons to immigration authorities." Eight months later, such referrals to DHS doubled from 4,589 to 8,874, including one undocumented immigrant passenger (i.e., not a driver) from Mexico who was arrested after police observed the car he was riding in fail to stop at a stop sign and then asked all of the car's occupants to produce identification.
6 5 It is therefore entirely possible to predict how a state or locality's overbroad interrogation policy would coordinate with REAL ID implementation if New Jersey were to comply with REAL ID Act's licensing regulations. 6 In addition to REAL ID, the Department ofJustice ("DOJ"), as predecessor to DHS, developed agreements under section 2 8 7 (g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act after the 9/11 attacks to deputize local law enforcement authorities to investigate, apprehend, and detain undocumented residents. 7 As of November 17, 62 
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2008, ICE has active agreements with 63 local law enforcement agencies in 20 states." ICE reports that the program has, since January 2006, led to the identification of more than 70,000 individuals "suspected of being in the country illegally." 6 9 After entering into a section 28 7 (g) agreement, Maricopa County, Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio has sent officers through Latino neighborhoods, pulling cars over for broken taillights or turn-signal violations, checking drivers' and passengers' papers and arresting scores of undocumented immigrants. 70 After receiving months of complaints, DOJ launched a civil rights investigation of the police department, focusing on "patterns or practices of discriminatory police practices and unconstitutional searches and seizures. "71 The section 2 8 7 (g) deputization program actively encourages states and localities to opt into immigration enforcement without providing protections against racial profiling and other forms of discriminatory harassment.
D. Stemming the Tide, or Extinguishing State Experimentation?
Groups that oppose expanding-or more accurately, restoring-immigrants' eligibility for driver's licenses largely believe that REAL ID's measures can play a key role in deterring and disrupting undocumented immigrant populations. 72 Prior efforts over the past decade similar to REAL-ID had explicitly sought-but failedto use of state's licensing of motorists to uproot non-citizens. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRAIRA") requiring states to include Social Security numbers on driver's licenses; the provision was repealed four years later on account of privacy concerns and fears that it would create a national ID card." Nevertheless, IIRAIRA included a provision permitting states to conduct a pilot program for denying drivers' licenses to the undocumented." Private actors such as employers responded to immigration reform measures that increased the use of driver's licenses as proof of identity acceptable for employment, 7 5 especially after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which for the first time in U.S. history prohibited the hiring of undocumented immigrants. 76 Unlike the section 2 8 7 (g) deputization program, the REAL ID Act licensing regime is the first fifty-state attempt by the U.S. federal government to undermine the relief that states may provide to immigrants under a "steam valve" theory. Professor Peter J. Spiro proposed a "steam-valve" theory to describe how states "desiring stricter enforcement of immigration laws could pursue that objective without imposing their preference on states in which immigration might be considered a neutral or positive factor" because it would be better for aliens "to be driven from a hostile California to a receptive New York than to be shut out of the United States altogether." 7 7 Spiro's theory, however, might be updated to address the limits of perceived long-term relief within states given the political incentive of local and state officials anywhere to propose, pass, or simply announce their preferences regarding federal immigration policy as an explicit overture to voters to elect them to federal office, as may have been the case with New York's Governor Pataki.
7 ' The REAL ID Act's logic rests on its ability to extinguish "sanctuary" cities, states, and other sub-federal political divisions.
From an immigrant advocate's perspective, the REAL ID Act countermands many states' and localities' efforts to integrate immigrants within their populace, such as expanding employment opportunities and protections for immigrants, by operating as a measure to curb the social and economic mobility of non-citizens THE REAL ID ACT such as the undocumented." The natural arc of such a program is the exclusion of immigrants from more than just roadways, and the multiplication of border line-drawing within states themselves. REAL ID, if implemented, excludes undocumented immigrants from a wide range of economic and social activity in which a driver's license serves as a vital identification function: opening a bank account,o purchasing a home, 8 ' renting an apartment, 8 2 accessing financial credit," and traveling by major alternative modes of transportation.
Ubiquitous demands for their presentation render what is legally considered a "privilege" into a deprivation of necessities, geographic segregation, and the denial of an identity for many immigrants.
Because 86% of all trips within the United States are made by car, loss of driving privileges can make it difficult or nearly impossible for individuals to keep their jobs, reach a hospital during an emergency, and participate in public activities." Myriad drivingdependent job opportunities, including taxi and livery, trucking, delivery, and parking services, will vanish, along with jobs in suburban and rural areas that are only accessible by car. In some states, any individuals who insist on driving unlicensed as undocumented immigrants risk arrest and criminal sanctions and, in most instances, deportation." Some legal scholars have argued that the past two decades of immigration reform have required activists to extol the virtues of clear-cut federalism, and in the alternative, localism, in immigration policy where it comes to demographic expertise and experimentation." Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan has argued that the Rehnquist Court's revival of federalism, and the elevation of judicial intervention on behalf of states' rights, protects opportunities for states or localities to engage in social experimentation for projects that would not be viable at the national level: from legalizing same-sex marriage to authorizing physician-assisted suicide." Professor Clare Huntington suggests that allowing for a range of immigration regulation (perhaps even where state policies conflict with federal law and would not exist but for the grace of federal inaction) "would let other countries know that there is a diversity of opinion among U.S. citizens with regard to non-citizens." 8 After REAL ID, the absence of a driver's license is certain to arouse suspicions that an individual is undocumented, and will have certain effects documented under section 28 7 (g): discouraging immigrant individuals and households from contacting the police, even as witnesses to a crime, 9 0 and increased racial profiling by police of "foreign-looking" citizens and non-citizens alike." Some ing a statute, since found to be preempted by federal law, making operation of a motor vehicle in the state as an immigrant without lawful presence a crime).
87 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 17. 88 801-802 (2006) . Sullivan notes that the Court's other doctrines continue to operate as limits on state power such as: (1) declining to revive the notion that "state autonomy over traditional and integral governmental functions that are absolutely immunized from federal control"; (2) Congress could condition its spending on the states contingent to states' conformity with Congressional goals rationally related to the spending; (3) declining to overrule Ex parte Young suits against state officials; and (4) Apr. 20 , 2008, at 9 (discussing a national survey in which approximately three in four police chiefs who considered but decided against training officers to do immigration duty did so out of "a concern that it would decrease overall public safety because undocumented residents, fearing deportation, would be less likely to contact the police if they were a victim of, or witness to, a crime. cities and police departments have instituted policies that prohibit city employees, such as police officers, from inquiring about an individual's immigration status. 9 2 If the resurgence of states' involvement in immigration issues through traditional state functions continues apace without federal checks and safeguards, state officials across an array of agencies will likely otherwise receive a great deal of latitude in implementation. Given developments in the states of New York, New Jersey, and Arizona-among other states and localities-it will inevitably produce state practices permitting or officially sanctioning local officials to directly engage in discriminatory and racist actions against state residents who may appear "foreign."
IV. POSSIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE REAL ID ACT
There are currently no special equal-protection prohibitions against discriminatory actions that target non-citizens and undocumented immigrants under current case law, although some legal analysts have voiced concerns regarding post-REAL ID barriers to the substantive fundamental right to travel of both citizens and non-citizens." Instead, the residual nature of states' authority over its non-citizen residents renders Tenth Amendment challenges to REAL ID concerning federalism and political accountability for failures of such congressionally imposed policies more likely to succeed. International human rights instruments may also be persuasive, but they may not be considered binding upon U.S. courts.
A. Equal Protection Challenges
Equal protection law currently does not protect undocumented immigrants as a "suspect class" that requires a court's active protection. funded by the state of Texas despite finding they did not constitute a "suspect class" because a state effort to bar undocumented immigrant children from the classroom was irrational in its clear effect of producing illiterate and "stigmatized" students." An argument that federal or state implementation of the REAL ID Act or similar DMV policies violates the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the undocumented, on account of the stigma of not being able to carry state-issued identification, has yet to be successfully litigated." One weakness underlying either a "stigma" or "burden" argument is that under REAL ID, individuals are not prohibited from using an international or foreign license to drive within the states, or using consular identification or passports as identification for travel or other purposes.
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit held in League of United Latin Americans Citizens v. Bredesen that a Tennessee statute that denied driver's licenses to any applicants who were not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and permitted only driving "certificates" to temporary residents with lawful presence, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause." Thus, unlike Plyler the suspect class involved immigrants with temporary status, not the undocumented. The court applied rational-basis scrutiny and found that Tennessee's interest in not vouching for the identity of aliens who had not been granted lawful permanent status was rationally supported by the statute's DMV policy. 7 Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that denial of a driver's license burdened their fundamental right to travel because the court failed to find any authority for the proposition that lawful temporary resident aliens enjoy the same fundamental right to travel as U.S. citizens, and also found that the state's issuance of alternative "certificates" did not impermissibly burden plaintiffs movements." 
B. A Potential Tenth Amendment Challenge Asserting States' Rights
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state-issued IDs for boarding planes and accessing courthouses. The REAL ID Act's recently-issued implementing regulations require states that do not comply-for reasons of federalism, privacy, or immigrants' rights concerns-nevertheless change the appearance of their states' DMV-issued IDs to indicate that they are not in compliance and therefore unavailable to be used for federal purposes. Imposing such requirements upon states whether or not they comply with the licensing regulations would violate the Tenth Amendment. State officials face the real possibility of U.S. citizens who comprise their electorate encountering significant barriers in the exercise of their right to travel-a "privilege and immunity of national citizenship under the Constitution "rs-and their First Amendment right to access to the courts,' 1 4 unless they sacrifice their sovereignty.
The REAL ID Act requires states to implement the sheer majority of its regulatory scheme, also arguably in violation of the Tenth Amendment. In some states, requiring States to adopt the practice of linking license expiration dates with an individual's immigration status requires approval of the state legislature because DHS admits it lacks the authority to directly mandate this change.
15
States that do comply must commit a significant amount of resources to conduct immigration document verifications, including paying for each document validation query to DHS databases, and have no discretion to use the exceptions process outlined in DHS regulations to permit non-citizens to use alternate documents to prove their lawful status in the United States and thus alleviate the administrative burdens upon their residents.
16
These two issues most directly interfere with a state's exercise of its sovereign capacity and would effectively "commandeer" state legislatures in the service of a federal law, prohibited under New York and Printz. The REAL ID Act, which failed to pass Congress as a standalone bill and imposed upon states without full debate, thus raises substantive Tenth Amendment concerns regarding federal intrusion into state licensing and public safety, both traditional areas of state sovereignty.
C. REAL ID and Standards Expressed in International Conventions
More than half a century ago, the United States spearheaded efforts to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes a "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state."' 1 7 However, although the U.N. General Assembly ratified the declaration by proclamation, it is not a treaty and thus not legally binding as there are technically no signatories to the Declaration. 1 8 Another international instrument, the U.N. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, recognizes the "right to liberty of movement in the territory of the State of employment and freedom to choose their residence there.""' However, the United States is not a ratifying nation nor a signatory to the Convention. 1 20 Even if the United States had ratified it, the Convention permits a nation to justify restricting a person's movement if "necessary to protect national security." 1 21 It has been suggested by Professors Raquel Aldana and Sylvia Lazos Vargas that the REAL ID Act's denial of driver's licenses infringes upon the right of every individual to be recognized as a person under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Given the discussion above regarding the pervasive nature of driver's licenses as identification, there is an argument that states have responsibility for implementing the ICCPR in its ratification instrument. 1 2 3 A major hurdle, however, is that the Senate declared that "provisions of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing" and therefore does not automatically become binding U.S. domestic law.1
24
CONCLUSION
States that comply with REAL ID do so at the risk of losing the only formal and accurate relationship they may have with potentially hundreds of thousands of their residents who are undocumented immigrants or immigrants who cannot, after reasonable effort, substantiate their identity. Where the federal government has by infrastructural necessity abdicated its day-to-day interaction with non-citizens, driving more than 13 million immigrants further underground under the REAL ID Act has meant that the government also loses the opportunity to form any relationship with noncitizens actually present in the United States and to advance the national security objectives it boldly articulated after 9/11. As discussed earlier, the lack of any state-issued driver's license may itself become a scarlet letter that facilitates abuse outside of public view.
For non-citizens with lawful status, if states and the federal government sincerely desire to assimilate them, providing them with a different, "temporary" license instantly brands them as outsiders. In Texas, where the state has begun to issue vertically-oriented driver's IDs to such individuals, Edwin Palacio, a political asylee from the Philippines who has resided in the United States since the early 1990s, told a reporter that the new Texas rules have created "confusion instead of clarity" and "suspicion instead of trust": "'I strove to build a new life here,' said Mr. Palacio, who works as an information systems auditor in Austin. 'Imagine my shock, my dis- The ideological debates arising from a Tenth Amendment federalism analysis involving an immigrants' rights issue is ripe for future discussion, but it is worth noting here that states' arguments that Congress has overstepped its authority mainly focus on states' fiscal burdens and on defects in REAL ID implementation-i.e., political responsibility to states in their sovereign capacity-while the interstitial jurisdictional vacuums in our nation's current immigration federalism framework do not place state voters and nonvoting non-citizens on equal footing. The provision of additional federal funds and flexibility in REAL ID Act implementation, for example, will not cure the law of its significant immigration federalism concerns. This Article is an initial step to theoretically connect the behavior of self-interested state officials with an ethos of non-discrimination toward non-voting immigrant populations. In 2009, it remains to be seen whether President Barack Obama and a new Congress take up this opportunity for lawmakers to reexamine whether an ill-conceived and poorly designed act of Congress is legally sound, materially feasible, and politically accountable. 
